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Abstract
Background: This study tests whether depression, psychosocial adversity, and limited social assets offer protection or
suggest vulnerability to the process of radicalisation.
Methods: A population sample of 608 men and women of Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin, of Muslim heritage, and aged 18–
45 were recruited by quota sampling. Radicalisation was measured by 16 questions asking about sympathies for violent
protest and terrorism. Cluster analysis of the 16 items generated three groups: most sympathetic (or most vulnerable), most
condemning (most resistant), and a large intermediary group that acted as a reference group. Associations were calculated
with depression (PHQ9), anxiety (GAD7), poor health, and psychosocial adversity (adverse life events, perceived
discrimination, unemployment). We also investigated protective factors such as the number social contacts, social capital
(trust, satisfaction, feeling safe), political engagement and religiosity.
Results: Those showing the most sympathy for violent protest and terrorism were more likely to report depression (PHQ9
score of 5 or more; RR = 5.43, 1.35 to 21.84) and to report religion to be important (less often said religion was fairly rather
than very important; RR = 0.08, 0.01 to 0.48). Resistance to radicalisation measured by condemnation of violent protest and
terrorism was associated with larger number of social contacts (per contact: RR = 1.52, 1.26 to 1.83), less social capital
(RR = 0.63, 0.50 to 0.80), unavailability for work due to housekeeping or disability (RR = 8.81, 1.06 to 37.46), and not being
born in the UK (RR = 0.22, 0.08 to 0.65).
Conclusions: Vulnerability to radicalisation is characterised by depression but resistance to radicalisation shows a different
profile of health and psychosocial variables. The paradoxical role of social capital warrants further investigation.
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Background
A process termed ‘radicalisation’ is proposed by governments
across the world to explain how ordinary people with no history of
criminality commit aggressive and terrorist acts against innocent
civilians in their own country [1]. Conceptualised in social and
psychological terms, this theory of radicalisation proposes a
pathway which begins with the development of sympathies
towards violent protest and terrorism through to active participa-
tion in violent terrorist acts [2,3]. It is acknowledged that not all
those with sympathies progress to become violent terrorists.
Counter-terrorism efforts have been largely restricted to identify-
ing high-risk individuals rather than understanding how to prevent
radicalisation by intervening at an earlier stage of the process.
Public health policies, research and interventions offer a different
approach to health protection and intervene at the level of
populations and identify and reduce common risk factors whilst
promoting protective factors and resistance to rare diseases and
damaging behaviour. Might this approach be applied to prevent
radicalisation?
The recent waves of terrorism are sometimes understood as
extreme religious movements with a particular focus on Islamic
fundamentalism [4], but research into the propaganda spread by
these groups suggests that it is political rhetoric disguised as
religious ideology [5]. [6] Thus terrorism may be conceptualised as
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a powerful form of persuasion that induces fear and makes political
gains by promoting dangerous and infectious ideas [6]. Taking this
analogy further, Stares and Yacoubian propose that public health
methods used to prevent the transmission of communicable
diseases can also be deployed to inhibit the spread of terrorist
philosophy [7,8]. In their model, terrorist organisations are akin to
a host, militant ideologies are the infectious agents, and settings
such as prisons or even the internet act as vectors or vehicles for
transmission. In fact, population approaches in public health are
already being used to combat bio-terrorism and war [9,10],
homicide, violence, self-harm and suicide [11]. To advance this
approach to prevent radicalisation we require a better under-
standing of risk and protective factors.
Among the conditions implicated in the radicalisation process
are a sense of inequity and injustice, perceived discrimination,
marginalisation, and a lack of integration in wider society [12]
[13]. These narratives of adversity, alongside migration experi-
ences, have also been proposed as causing depression and
psychosis [14–19]. Social explanations and psychiatric opinions
abound when known terrorists face conviction [20], yet there are
few empirical population studies that investigate these possible
explanations for radicalisation and terrorism [21,22]. One
exception is an exploratory study of 52 teenage boys in Gaza
that found depressive symptoms were common in supporters of
‘religio-political aggression’, whilst anxiety was heightened
amongst Palestinian supporters of radical action [23]. Another
interesting study used convergence of psychometric measures from
356 suicide-bombers, tapes of self-immolations of 15 terrorists, and
918 ‘zealots’ in order to isolate risk factors [24]. The emergent
profile implicated susceptibility to ‘dogma-induced psychotic
depression’ amongst many other social and political characteris-
tics. A risk-assessment instrument developed in Canada explored
common characteristics of terrorists from diverse backgrounds
[25,26]. This identified perceived grievances about victimization
and injustice as risk factors, whilst contact with other extremists,
social isolation, previous exposure to violence, commitment to acts
of terrorism because of anger or because of sacred ideology about
rewards of participating in terrorism were proposed as contextual
factors. Strikingly, protective factors in this study included a
change in attitudes and beliefs about the role of terrorism in their
lives, condemnation of it, and a commitment to move away from
such acts.
Social capital has been implicated in radicalisation and
terrorism [27]. This concept captures the assets, resources or
‘capital’ available to individuals and groups; it has been defined as
community cohesion and resilience resulting from a rich
associational life based on a strong array of co-operative social
networks [11,28–31]. Poor health and depressive symptoms can be
a consequence of low social capital, isolation and inequalities, as
well as experience of hardship, such as discrimination [32–34].
This study tests hypotheses about depression, psychosocial
adversity and social assets as risk and resiliency factors in the early
phases of radicalisation when preventive interventions might make
the biggest impact [35]. In our previous paper we described a new
way of assessing sympathies for violent protest and terrorism
(SVPT) [36]. SVPT were rare (present in less than 3% of a
population sample) so the study had limited power to detect effects.
And we had not considered degrees of condemnation of violent
protest and terrorism (CVPT) as a marker of resistance or as
protective factors. Furthermore, whilst developing an outcome
based on factor analysis, we removed items relating to interna-
tional relations and government policy. In this paper, we use all
the outcome data and methods to refine and improve our measure
of radicalisation including all the items originally generated by
focus groups and refined by testing.
In this paper we identify modifiable protective and risk factors
that might be used to address vulnerabilities. We hypothesise that
depressive symptoms, psychosocial adversity and limited social
assets are positively correlated with SVPT and negatively
correlated with CVPT. Furthermore, in our previous paper, we
found that continuous measures of depressive and of anxiety
symptoms did not correlate with SVPT, but we did not test non-
linear associations across different levels of SVPT and CVPT, and
nor did we test different validated thresholds used for screening for
depression.
In this paper we address these limitations and ask the following
research questions:
Are depression, psychosocial adversity and limited social assets
risk (associated with SVPT) or protective (associated with CVPT)
factors?
What demographic and psychosocial characteristics confer
protection by showing associations with CVPT?
Are there risk and protective factors that show trends, akin to
dose response relationships, for differing levels of condemnation to
sympathies for violent protest and terrorism?
Methods Section
Sample
We surveyed 608 people of Pakistani or Bangladeshi family
origins, aged 18–45, of Muslim heritage and living in East London
and Bradford. The study sample methods have previously been
reported (http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.
1371%2Fjournal.pone.0090718) [36]. Bradford was chosen be-
cause a significant proportion of the Muslim population live in
traditional and relatively isolated areas characterised by poverty
and deprivation. These factors are often thought to generate
dissatisfaction and grievances, for example, when expressed
through conflict between gangs and during riots [30,34]. East
London with a substantial Muslim population offers a contrast,
having greater cultural diversity and wider opportunities for
employment. Individuals were recruited to the study by quota
samples, a standard method for opinion polls that entails setting
quotas for participation on a range of demographic factors [37].
The expected number of Muslim households in each output area
was estimated using the 2001 Census and mid-year 2010
estimates, and then classified into high, medium or low
concentration areas. A disproportionately stratified sample of 70
sampling points was drawn; the sample over-represented areas
with high and medium concentrates of Muslim households to
improve the efficiency of recruitment. Within each sampling point,
a representative population of Muslims aged 18–45 was inter-
viewed: quotas were set on age, gender, working status, and
whether Bangladeshi or Pakistani origin.
Data Collection
The data were collected by IPSOS-MORI Social Research
Institute. All questions were piloted and refined following two sets
of four interviews to check wording, sensitivity, and questioning
styles. Interviewers from IPSOS-MORI have significant experi-
ence of research into sensitive topics including religion and
terrorism. IPSOS-MORI employs a workforce of trained inter-
viewers resident in the communities where the survey took place so
they could frame questions sensitively about social, lifestyle, health
and safety issues for young Muslims. The pilot work did not
indicate difficulties. Although the option of language and gender
specific interviews was available, it did not prove necessary.
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Questions were asked in a computer-assisted format with prompts
and cues so that sensitive questions could be answered anony-
mously.
Survey Questions
A measure of risks for and resilience against violent
radicalization. There is currently no well-established measure
of radicalisation at a population level. Therefore, as reported in
our previous paper [36], we developed survey questions by a series
of interactive focus groups with young people of Muslim heritage
and with members of a community panel of religious and non-
religious organisations. This preceded the survey. The focus group
generated a spectrum of 16 acts of protest ranging from non-
violent (one item) through to more and more extreme acts, and
culminating in acts of terrorism; for example, use of suicide bombs
to fight injustice or commit terrorist acts (see Tables S1 and S2). In
the survey, subjects were asked to rate their sympathies or
condemnation of these acts. All except two of these items were
scored on a 7-point Likert scale from -3 (completely condemn) to +
3 (completely sympathise). Thus the higher the score, the greater
were the sympathies for violent protest and terrorism. Two
questions asked about sympathies for or condemnation of the
British government’s decision to send British troops to Afghanistan
and to Iraq. These were reverse-scored as, according to our focus
group discussions during item generation, condemnation rather
than sympathies would be consistent with a more radicalised
perspective [4].
Risk and protective factors. Social capital can be measured
in many ways and is known to be associated with violence [30,31],
suicide [38] and mental health [39]. To measure social capital, we
asked about satisfaction with living in the area (very satisfied, fairly
satisfied, neither satisfied or dissatisfied, fairly dissatisfied, very
dissatisfied), number of years living in a particular area (,1 year, 1
to ,2 years, 2 to ,5 years, 5 to ,10 years, . or = 10 years), how
many people in local area can be trusted (many, some, a few or
none), and feelings of safety when alone in the area after dark (very
safe, fairly safe, fairly unsafe, very unsafe). Answers were scored
and summed so that a higher score reflected higher social capital
(0–18). As a measure of social isolation and support, we asked
about the number of contacts by telephone, email, or visit in the
preceding two weeks by friends or relatives.
Understanding of political processes or ready access to political
institutions might serve as protective factors as they offer a
democratic and non-violent method to address perceived injustic-
es. We assessed political engagement by asking about participation
in 12 types of activity in the preceding three years. These questions
were from the Department of Communities and Citizenship
Survey [40]. These questions addressed voting in local council
elections, political discussions, signing a petition, donations to a
charity or campaigning organisation, payment of membership fees
to a charity or campaigning organisation, voluntary work, a
boycott for political, ethical, environmental or religious reasons,
political views expressed online, attendance at a political meeting,
donations to or membership of a political party, and participation
in a demonstration or march. The total number of activities
formed a measure of political engagement (scores from 0–12) [40].
We assessed perceived discrimination by asking four questions
from the EMPIRIC study [33]; these asked about physical assault,
damage to property and insults in the preceding 12 months, and
any instance of unfair treatment at work where these events were
thought to be related to race, skin colour, religion or ethnic
background insults. The measure of threatening life events
included injury, bereavement, separations, loss of job, financial
crisis, problems with the police or courts, theft and major stressful
events in the preceding 12 months (score 0–12) [41].
Given the emphasis on religiosity as an explanation, questions
on religiosity were included. These questions asked about the
importance of religion in everyday life (very important versus fairly
important/not important/don’t know) and frequency of attending
a mosque (weekly or more, monthly or less frequently, or never).
We also asked about a number of demographic characteristics
(age, employment), place of birth.
Health Outcomes. To measure general functioning related
to poor health, four Likert questions were adapted from the SF12
[42]. These self-report measures assessed general health, reduced
activities because of physical or emotional problems, being limited
by physical or emotional problems, and not being able to
undertake any vigorous activities. They were each recoded to
binary variables and summed so that a higher total score indicated
poorer health (scores range from 0–4). Anxiety was measured by
the Generalised Anxiety Disorder Assessment (GAD-7) [43] and
depression by the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9) as total
scores and as non-linear scores using validated thresholds [44].
Statistical Analyses. We calculated the number of people
showing sympathies for or condemnation of violent protest and
terrorism (Table S1: for each of the Likert items we show weighted
and unweighted estimates). The weighting was for combined
design effect and response weights to ensure the estimates were
reflective of population level findings. Weighted calculations were
undertaken in STATA 11.0 using the ‘pw’ command to provide
robust standard errors and the procedure does not inflate the
sample bases [45].
To explore whether there was evidence of distinct groups of
respondents who exhibited varying degrees of radicalisation, a
particular method of cluster analysis was applied to the data for
the 16 radicalisation items [46]. In this study a classification
likelihood method was used [46,47]. The Bayesian Information
Criterion was used to determine the number of cluster in the data.
The clustering was carried out on the principal component scores
from a principal components analysis of the original 16 item
scores. The clustering was carried out using different numbers of
principal component scores and the most stable solution found was
the one with the three groups described in this papers. The cluster
analysis was implemented in the mclust package in R. All other
analyses were conducted in STATA (11.0).
A cluster analysis of the 16-item measure of sympathies for
violent protest and terrorism produced a three-group solution: a
group that was most sympathetic (group 3, n= 92), least
sympathetic (group 1, n= 93), and a large intermediary group
(group 2, n= 423). The values of the mean score for each group
suggest the cluster labels reflect an ordinal variable for radicalisa-
tion, so the study has potential to identify dose-response
relationships. (Table S2: the mean scores for each cluster are
shown overall and for each of the 16 items).
For each of the proposed risk and protective factors, we
calculated the total sample size for each response category, and
show the total weighted prevalence (%) and standard error (se) for
categorical variables; for continuous variables we provided and
weighted mean and standard error (se).
After defining the three groups derived from cluster analysis,
univariable weighted distributions health measures and potential
risk and resiliency factors were calculated and charted for each of
the three cluster derived groups. The three-group cluster derived
variable was used as a three level outcome in multinomial logistic
regression models (univariable and multivariable); the largest
group, group 2 served as the reference category.
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For the weighted multivariable model, all the variables were
included in order to provide the most conservative model that
would take account of potential residual confounding. The
findings are shown as Risk Ratios, and 95% confidence intervals
and probability values (RR, 95% CI, p). Religious practice and
importance were included to test whether the findings were
sustained independent of religiosity. A gender interaction term
with depressive symptoms was considered given depression is more
common in women. Model fit with and without the interaction
term was assessed using the likelihood ratio test.
Our ‘a priori’ framework for interpreting the results proposed
that any variable more commonly found in group 3 compared to 2
was associated with sympathies for violent protest and terrorism,
and was therefore a risk factor for violent radicalisation; in contrast
variables less common in group 3 compared with 2 would offer
resistance or be like resiliency factors. Any variables that were
more common in group 1 compared with 2 would be implicated as
a correlate of condemnation of violent protest and terrorism and
therefore would be interpreted as a offering resistance or
resiliency; any variable less common in group 1 compared to 2
would then be implicated as undermining resistance.
Ethical approval. Ethical approval was from Queen Mary,
University of London Research Ethics Committee (REC);
additional legal advice influenced the wording of questions. The
REC reviewed and approved all the questions, and the informa-
tion sheets and consent forms. The study was subject to an
independent monitoring committee chaired by a professor of
ethics in the law department at Queen Mary University of
London. No adverse incidents or issues were reported during data
collection. Data were collected by individual interviews, admin-
istered on a laptop computer by interviewers. Consent was
recorded by checking an appropriate box before proceeding with
the computer-based survey.
Results
Demographic, psychosocial, and health characteristics
Table 1 shows weighted response rates for each of the
demographic, psychosocial and health characteristics. The weight-
ed data representative of the population show a sample composed
mostly of the 26–35 year age group, who are mostly employed and
born in the UK, living in London; for the majority, religion was
reported as very important in their daily lives, a point supported at
least weekly mosque attendance.
Weighted (unadjusted) population prevalence estimates of risk
and protective factors were charted by the three groups derived by
cluster analysis. The data for demographic characteristics are
charted in Figure 1 as percentages and standard errors. Figure 2
shows the psychosocial and health characteristics.
In comparison with group 2, unemployment was less common
in group 1 (RR=0.23, 95%CI: 0.07–0.77, p = 0.02); social capital
was poorer in group 1 (RR=0.76, 95%CI: 0.63–0.92, p = 0.004;
people in group 1 were less likely to be born in the UK (RR=0.22,
95%CI: 0.08–0.65, p = 0.006). Among migrants, the number of
years of residence in the UK did not show any relationship with
cluster membership (unreported data).
In comparison with group 2, political engagement was poorer
for group 3 (RR=0.63, 95%CI: 0.44 to 0.9, p = 0.01) and
depressive symptoms appear to be more prevalent for group 3
(weighted mean 5.00, 95%CI: 2.95 to 7.06) (weighted mean 3.14,
95%CI: 1.38 to 4.90). Psychosocial adversity and poor health
appeared not to be relevant.
In order to address potential confounders, adjusted logistic
regression models were built. This approach addresses potential
confounding influences that might show associations in unadjusted
analyses that are not sustained in multivariable analyses; or
negative confounders may mask true associations in unadjusted
analyses for these only to be revealed in multivariable analyses.
Multivariable analyses (weighted)
Table 2 sets out the estimated risk ratios and associated
confidence intervals for associations between cluster derived
groups and demographic characteristics, psychosocial adversity,
social capital and health measures, adjusted for ethnicity and
religiosity. The comparisons are of group 3 with group 2, and of
group 1 with group 2. Overall there was good model fit
(R2= 25.38, X2 =85.51, df = 44, p = 0.0002),
Compared with the group 2, people in the group showing most
sympathies for violent protest and terrorism (group 3) were more
likely to report depressive symptoms, less likely to include people of
Bangladeshi ethnic origin, and less likely to include people
reporting religion as fairly rather than very important in their
lives. Low levels of political engagement were no longer associated
with membership of group 3. Contrary to popular views about
radicalisation, unemployment, educational achievements, discrim-
ination, and stressful life events did not show associations with
sympathies towards violent protest and terrorism.
Group 1 showed the most condemnation of violent protest and
terrorism. Group 1 was more likely (compared with group 2) to
include people unavailable for work (mostly women who were
looking after the home) and migrants born outside of the UK who
would therefore have migrated to the UK; Group 1 compared
with 2, reported a greater number of social contacts, lower social
capital, and marginally more depressive symptoms. In univariable
analyses, fewer people in groups 1 were unemployed, compared
with group 2. Theis findings were not sustained in multivariable
analyses.
The PHQ score was entered as a continuous score of depressive
symptoms. The PHQ score does not indicate clinically significant
depressive symptoms and there may be threshold effects. In order
to investigate the relationship between depression and cluster
derived group membership further, we applied validated clinical
thresholds used to screen for mild (5 or more) and moderate (10 or
more) depression. On repeating the analyses, mild depression was
associated with membership of group 3 but moderate depression
was not (see Table 3). If depression was entered as a binary
variable using a threshold of 5 or more to indicate mild and
moderate depressive symptoms, depression was still more preva-
lent in group 3. A log likelihood ratio test indicated no difference
in model fit between a 3 (none, mild, moderate) or 2 category
(none, mild and more severe) measure of depression (X2=2.91,
df = 2, p = 0.23). Although gender was not associated with cluster
membership, the point estimates indicate women were less likely to
be in group 1 and more likely to be in group 3; and given
depression is more common in women, this model was repeated
with an interaction term between gender and depression. This
model did not show a better fit (likelihood ratio test X2=4.44,
df = 2, p = 0.11); the findings overall remained identical with a
non-significant interaction term. In order to assess whether the
suicide item in the PHQ9 was driving the associations with
depression, we repeated these models without this item and found
the same overall findings.
Discussion
Principal findings
Depressive symptoms (PHQ score of 5 or more indicating at
least mild depression) were more common among those showing
Depression, Social Assets and Violent Radicalisation
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 September 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 9 | e105918
the most sympathy towards violent protest and terrorism.
Although previous studies of terrorists have not shown significantly
greater levels of severe mental illness (for example, psychoses with
delusions and hallucinations), small studies of convicted terrorists
and of teenagers in Palestine have suggested depressive and
anxiety symptoms are important [23] [13]. One study seeking to
define religious terrorism proposed the presence of ‘dogma
induced psychotic depression’ but this investigation was not based
Table 1. Demographic, psychosocial & health characteristics.
Weighted
DEMOGRAPHICS
Age group 18–25 % 25.98
(N=599) 26–35 % 48.91
36–45 % 25.11
Gender Men % 54.45
(n = 608) Women % 45.55
Single Yes % 54.45
(N=608) No % 45.55
Employment status Employed % 50.26
(N=608) Full time education % 11.05
Unemployed % 9.92
Permanent disability/retired % 0.64
Look after house 28.14
City London % 80.62
(N=608) Bradford % 19.38
ETHNICITY AND RELGIOSITY
Ethnic Group Pakistani % 46.65
(n = 608) Bangladeshi % 53.35
Born in UK Yes % 70.93
(n = 608) No 29.07
Importance of Religion to way of life Very % 71.99
(N=608) Fairly, not or don’t know % 28.1
Attending a place of worship: mosque Never % 28.47
(N=604) Monthly or less % 13.86
Weekly or more % 57.68
PSYCHOSOCAL ADVERSITY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL
Social capital score mean 7.61
(N=608) se 0.21
Total social contacts mean 4.64
(N=608) se 0.21
Political engagement mean 1.98
(N=608) se 0.12
Discrimination mean 0.2
(N=608) se 0.04
Life events mean 0.58
(N=608) se 0.07
HEALTH MEASURES
Generalised anxiety on GAD score mean 2.95
(N=562) se 0.47
Depressive symptom on PHQ9 score mean 3.34
(N=527) se 0.5
Poor Health Total Score mean 0.74
(greater score = poorer health) se 0.11
(N=608)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105918.t001
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on a structured diagnostic or screening instrument. The place of
psychological distress in terrorism is controversial [48]. It is known
that low mood is associated with hopelessness about the future,
and suicidal feelings, perhaps mediated through feelings of low
self-esteem, cognitive distortions in weighing up everyday events
and experiences as more negative [38]. These cognitive biases may
be seen as adaptive if they reflect social and economic injustices,
and experiences of structural violence; or these may reflect
depressive illness if there is not a history of such adversity. Our
findings suggest the latter, that depressive symptoms independent
of psychosocial adversity were associated with sympathies towards
violent protest and terrorism.
More generally, depression has been implicated in acts of
aggression [49,50]. Although depression and aggression can be
present from an early age and have genetic and neurochemical
origins [50,51], depression can also be a consequence of chronic
adversity, and can lead to maladaptive behaviour, social strain
[33] or abnormal personality development [51]. Personality
disorder is often implicated in crime, but is an unlikely explanation
of our finding as the majority of our sample were in employment
and reported active social networks (and additionally did not
report frequent hospital attendance due to accidents and injuries;
unreported data).
Social isolation has been proposed as a risk factor for
radicalization [52], and is also implicated as a link between
biological mechanisms of aggression and depression when tested in
animal models [53]. Consistent with this perspective, we found
that the group showing the strongest condemnation appeared to
have more social contacts. Isolation from the wider community,
together with feelings of identification and cohesion within
terrorist organisations, are a proposed mechanism by which
people are persuaded to take up violence, under the influence of
newly formed radical affiliations [12,19]. In multivariate analyses,
women seemed more likely to be in the most sympathetic group,
indicating greatest risk; this finding did not reach statistical
significance. A higher risk for women has previously been reported
but only where social isolation, powerlessness and oppression
limited alternative opportunities or lifestyles [54]. More in-depth
qualitative work exploring Muslim women’s experiences of
disadvantage and oppression may offer useful insights into the
place of gender politics and gender disadvantage as mechanism of
radicalisation.
A surprising finding was that low levels of social capital were not
related to sympathies towards terrorism but were associated with
greater condemnation of terrorist acts. In our study, social capital
was measured by satisfaction with residential area, trust in
neighbours and feelings of safety. As expected in accord with the
wider literature, poor social capital was associated with depression
(unreported data), suggesting that the survey questions seem to tap
the appropriate concepts [55]. A low score, therefore, reflected
fears associated with the neighbourhood, including violence in the
community, and explains condemnation of perceived threats. This
finding is also consistent with a recent analysis suggesting that
higher social capital can actually foster the formation of terrorist
groups through greater opportunities for co-operation and by the
exploitation of altruistic aspirations in a open democratic political
system [27]. However, a study of social capital and terrorism,
conducted over 12 years in 150 countries, showed that as well as
fostering more terrorist organisations, higher social capital actually
correlated with fewer terrorist attacks. So the influence of social
Figure 1. Demographic characteristics by clusters (univariable, weighted data).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105918.g001
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capital is complex and it does not seem to be easily modified for
predictable preventive effects.
Strengths and Weaknesses
Although the three-group solution was selected by a statistically
acceptable method of cluster analysis using a variety of sensible
criteria to indicate the ‘correct’ number of groups, the clusters
derived should be regarded as a preliminary and useful basis for
understanding and describing the survey responses. Replication is
recommended as one study does not provide definitive conclusions
on which to base policy.
As a cross-sectional study, causality cannot be directly inferred
but the three groups derived from cluster analysis are akin to an
ordinal variable permitting the comparison of specific character-
istics across the three groups. However, no single variable showed
linear trends across all three clusters. This suggests protective
factors associated with condemnation are different to those
associated with the development of sympathies for violent protest
and terrorism. Alternatively, we may have not included other
factors that might be linearly related with developing sympathies
for radicalisation.
Importantly, this study does not show which people who are
sympathisers are likely to progress to terrorist acts. However, there
is a sequence of events consistent with the stages of radicalization
[35], each with specific contexts and risk of progression [7]. This
model of public health epidemiology recommends that those
‘infected’ with radical ideology, or already radicalised, need to be
isolated so that they cannot influence those around them. The
criminal justice system fulfils this function. Those who are
vulnerable require inoculation through a wider set of ideas,
including orthodox religious texts that decry homicide and
terrorism. Furthermore, social networks promote resistance by
offering a range of cultural identities and opportunities and this in
itself may be protective; for example, integrated cultural identities
protect against psychological distress in young people by offering
bridging social capital across contrasting identity groups [56].
Studies of resilience to such radicalising ideas, where resilience
consists of resistance despite exposure to radicalising ideas in the
presence of SVPT, are needed.
Another reason for studying and preventing SVPT in the
population is that these become part of the political rhetoric of
terrorists and are used to justify their actions. Through encour-
aging SVPT, terrorists and extremists can seek resources for their
cause. There may be communalities with other extremist
movements, for example, animal rights protesters, or in situations
of war and conflict, or where extreme right wing parties target
particular ethnic, racial or religious groups [57,58]. Indeed, the
boundaries between protest movements and terrorism require
further investigation.
We had interpreted condemnation of sending British troops to
conflict zones as consistent with radicalisation because terrorists
have reported such actions as justification for their acts [4]. We
generated our items to measure radicalisation by reference to such
literature and by focus groups assuring us of face and content
validity. However, such condemnation could also indicate a
position of conscientious objection. In people of Muslim heritage,
this stance might be misunderstood to indicate radicalisation
rather than an anti-war or pacifist political position. Future studies
Figure 2. Psychosocial and health characteristics by clusters (multivariable, weighted data).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105918.g002
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will need to carefully discern whether such political objections are
separate from beliefs that are on the pathway to radicalisation. We
did not find political engagement to be associated with radicalisa-
tion suggesting that our findings are unlikely to reflect political
activism or conscientious objection.
Terrorist organisations in the past and in other cultures were
motivated by different social and political factors. As a result, our
findings relate to the current priorities of counter-terrorism in
Europe and North America, namely of understanding and
preventing the radicalisation of home-grown youth. It would not
be prudent to generalise the findings to other contexts and types of
terrorism, although similar research is feasible in other contexts.
For example, although ‘psychotic depression’ was implicated in a
study undertaken in a conflict zone [24], our findings indicate a
modest effect of depressive symptoms; we did not measure clinical
symptoms of psychosis directly. The attribution of psychosis
defined on the basis of delusions is subject to criticism, as delusions
are culturally shaped and can be seen as psychopathological only if
the beliefs held are culturally inappropriate. Fear of the enemy,
paranoia and depressive symptoms may be seen as ordinary
responses to war and conflict. Thus the study of psychological
distress in future studies must consider context: the influence of
conflict, culture and war on SVPT. Furthermore, our finding
suggest that depressive symptoms may be both protective and risk
factors, but it was only depressive symptoms meeting a screening
threshold for mild depressive illness that were risk factors. The
place of depressive symptoms clearly warrants further investiga-
tions.
Implications
Terrorist acts not only result in death, illness, and severe injury
to members of the public and emergency services, they also impact
adversely on social cohesion, accentuating divisions between
different racial and religious groups [59–61]. They raise legitimate
fears about safety and security [61,62]. Trauma, multiple
bereavements, and fear can have long-term consequences for
psychological health [63]. A preventive approach to radicalisation
is not part of current UK counter-terrorism policy, which focuses
on those likely to commit terrorist acts. Our study shows that there
are modifiable risk and protective factors for the earliest stage on
the pathway to violent protest. The potential benefits of disrupting
the pathways to radicalisation go beyond security issues and have
implications for preventing significant depressive symptoms,
promoting wellbeing and perhaps social capital [64]. More
research is needed into the causes of depressive thinking
implicated in our study. Future studies must investigate the place
of different types of social assets, depressive symptoms, and
psychosocial adversity in the process of radicalisation in different
heritage groups and in different country and regional contexts.
Our methods do offer an alternative paradigm for testing
interventions aimed at preventing or reversing the early stages of
violent radicalisation.
Key Messages
N Studies of sympathies for terrorism and violent radicalisation
are needed and feasible to undertake in a Muslim minority
country.
N Mild depressive symptoms as assessed on the PHQ9 are
associated with sympathies for violent protest and terrorism.
N A greater number of social contacts and being a migrant were
associated with more condemnation. Poorer social capital and
being unavailable for work because of housewife roles and
disability were associated with condemnation.
N Future work needs to investigate whether standardised
measures of social capital to replicate this unexpected finding
and to help understand the mechanisms.
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Table 3. Association of Depression category with cluster membership (fully adjusted model).
Cluster 1 Cluster 3
Depression Category RR 95%CI P value RR 95%CI p value
None (PHQ score 0–4) 1 1
Mild (PHQ score 5–9) 1.53 0.34 to 6.87 0.58 5.22 1.33 to 20.54 0.02
Moderate (PHQ score . or = 10) 9.54 0.43 to 210.34 0.15 6.52 0.35 to 121.78 0.21
None (PHQ score 0–4) 1 1
Mild or moderate (PHQ score 5 or more) 2.03 0.47 to 8.76 0.34 5.43 1.35 to 21.84 0.02
Cluster 2 is reference.
Repeating the analysis after removing the suicide item from the PHQ9 measure of depression produces the same overall findings.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105918.t003
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